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A country’s demographics have important bearings
on its economy and society.In Europe the decline of
birth rates and the increase in life expectancy have
already produced two important consequences.
First, in many European countries the total popula-
tion has been growing very slowly in the last decade
or it has been stagnant. Second, the proportion of
people who are “old”(65 and older) is rapidly grow-
ing, while the proportion of young people (30 or
younger) is shrinking. While these dynamics are at
work in most developed countries, in Europe they
are particularly stark.Table 1 shows the percentage
of population 65 and older in some representative
European and North American countries. It is clear
that European countries have aged much faster than
North American ones during the last 30 years.As of
2010 the percentage of population 65 and older 
was over 20 percent in Germany and Italy and only
12 percent in the US.
These changes have already had important effects on
the labor markets of European countries, affecting
the balance between young and old workers and on
the public sector costs, by challenging the sustain-
ability of the pension systems.
International migrations are also deeply affected by
the evolution of world demographics. On one hand
the migration pressures on Europe depend and will
depend on the demographic dynamics of its neigh-
bors (Africa), which are quite different from the de-
mographics of Asian and Latin American countries.
On the other hand immigration will affect the age
structure and the population dynamics of Europe in
ways that have important economic consequences.
In this paper I analyze four important ways in which
international migrations interact with demographic
phenomena and affect their economic consequences.
I will also point at important policy implications for
Europe.
• First, the demographic transition in developing
countries themselves, combined with the “life
cycle” of migrants, (higher probability of migrat-
ing when young and low probability when old)
will affect the emigration rates. In some develop-
ing countries (especially in Asia and Latin Amer-
ica) the transition from higher to lower fertility
rates has already happened. In others (mainly in
Africa) it is only at the beginning.These discrep-
ancies will affect the composition of world mi-
grants. In the coming decades, for geographical
and historical proximity to Africa, immigration
pressures are likely to be higher in Europe than in
North America.
• Second, the inflow of immigrants, who are youn-
ger and have higher fertility relative to natives,af-
fects the age composition and the rates of popu-
lation growth of receiving European countries. If
European countries let them in, young immi-
grants would increase the ratio of working to re-
tired people and hence the sustainability of the
pension systems. In the labor markets, they will
provide the skills and the abilities for jobs to be
performed by young workers, keeping high the
demand for complementary jobs performed by
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Table 1 
Population aged 65 and older as share of total in %








Source: Author's calculations based on UN popula-
tion data. older native workers. More open and work-ori-
ented immigration policies would allow Europe-
an countries to attenuate the economic conse-
quences of ageing and their population decline.
• Third,the ageing of the citizens of European coun-
tries and the shift in their sources of income from
labor (working) to capital (returns on pension
funds) should change their attitudes towards im-
migrants. Older people living off investment in-
come and public pension income (funded with
taxes on active workers) should see working immi-
grants as less of a threat and more as an economic
benefit for themselves.However,economic and so-
ciological research also shows that older people
fear immigrants and diversity more than younger
people. As politicians may cater to these fears it
will be even more important to bring solid econo-
mic consideration,rather than ideology,to the cen-
ter of the debate. This will be needed in order to
muster the political support for more open and
work-oriented immigration policies which would
significantly benefit the ageing native population.
• Finally the quality of life of ageing individuals in
rich countries and the labor participation of
women in the family (especially of those who
attend the needs of elderly parents) can be posi-
tively affected by the presence of immigrants. In
several countries, especially in southern Europe,
large part of the home and health services direct-
ed to the elderly is performed by immigrants.
They fill a large demand gap in those services.
Lacking an appropriate inflow of immigrant work-
ers, the services to older people would be per-
formed mainly by stay-at-home women, affecting
their labor force participation and their retirement
decision.
In the rest of the paper I will develop each of these
points in detail.
Focus on immigration from poor countries
As of 2009 the United Nations1 estimated that 10 per-
cent of the population residing in an OECD country
(and 9 percent of those in European countries) were
born abroad (immigrant).While a significant part of
this mobility originated from other developed coun-
tries (up to 50 percent in some countries),more than
half was coming from less developed countries. For
Europe, immigration from other rich countries is
mainly intra-European mobility and therefore not
subject to immigration policy restrictions. Immigra-
tion from poor countries is in large part from Africa
and, I will argue, it will be even greater in the future.
Before analyzing how immigration may interact with
the demographic pressures in Europe let us analyze
how the composition of immigrants from poor coun-
tries will be affected by demographic transition in
countries of emigration. Future European immigra-
tion policy should account for the shifting flows of
world migrants.
Demographic transition in developing countries
and future immigrants to Europe
In an interesting recent article Hatton and William-
son (2009) argue that for most “third world” coun-
tries the emigration rates (net emigrants relative to
the initial population) reached a peak during the late
1980s and early 1990s.They have been stable or even
declining since then. Dividing the world into three
large areas of emigration, Africa, Asia and Latin
America they show that for the last two regions emi-
gration rates have been declining during the 2000s.
The reason, they argue, was mainly demographical.
Many Asian and Latin American countries have ex-
perienced a rapid decline in the size of their birth
cohorts beginning in the 1980s.2 The smaller cohorts
reached their early working age, which is typically
the time of emigration, during the 1990s and the
2000s.As smaller cohorts reached their working age
and larger cohorts got older,net emigration rates de-
clined. In contrast many African countries have not
experienced the demographic decline yet (Table 2)
and hence their emigration rates have not peaked.
Migration rates exhibit some inertia.As previous mi-
grants attract new migrants via network and family
effects the inversion of migration rates (from grow-
ing to declining) may be slowed when fundamentals
changes. However Hatton and Williamson (2009)
argue that there is strong evidence that the cycle of
migration from Latin America and Asia has peaked:
the young cohorts are smaller and the income of
those countries has been growing, thereby reducing
the income gap. In contrast the cycle of emigration
from Africa is only at the beginning as those coun-
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tries are escaping dire poverty (which traps people
into the country) and still have high fertility rates.
This simple difference in the demographic profile of
world regions will change the composition of world
migrant flows. Fewer Asians and Latin Americans
will emigrate and more Africans will. Why is this
important for European countries? Because for
geographic and historical (colonial) reasons this
means that Europe will be more likely than North
America to be on the receiving end of the future
migration flows. Similarly, this means that the eco-
nomic future of Africa will affect migratory flows.
In the early phases of economic development,growth
in income per person is associated with larger mi-
gration rates. Fast economic growth in Africa may
imply larger migration of young people from that
region to Europe.
In order to illustrate the relationship between demo-
graphics in sending countries and emigration rates it
is instructive to consider, briefly, the case of emigra-
tion from Mexico. During the last four decades Mexi-
co-US has been the largest migra-
tion corridor in the world. It
involves short-distance migration
between a middle income and a
high income country. This situa-
tion is similar to that between Eu-
rope and North Africa and hence
this  case may contain a lesson
concerning the effect of demog-
raphy on emigration, which can
be useful for Europe. Mexico in
the 1970s was not very different
in terms of demographics and de-
velopment level to present day
North Africa.
Table 3 shows the net emigration
rates of Mexicans (including do-
cumented and undocumented emigrants). It is the
percentage of people born in Mexico who moved
abroad during each decade between 1970 and 2000
and between 2000 and 2005. This rate peaked in the
1980s with more than 5 percent of the Mexican pop-
ulation moving abroad during that decade alone. In
the following decades (1990s and 2000s) the net emi-
gration rates were much lower (around 2 percent).
The size of the birth cohorts in Mexico between 1950
and 2000 peaked before 1970 and has declined since
then. Hence, as also pointed out by Hanson and
McIntosh (2010), the decline of immigration rates
corresponds to the year when smaller birth cohorts
were reaching working age (16–20 years of age).
Therefore the lower emigration rates during the
1990s and the 2000s (and even more in the future
decades) have a simple explanation:fewer Mexicans,
were in the age bracket with a high risk of net emi-
gration. The Figure shows the percentage of emi-
grants in each male five-year cohort born in Mexico
between 1946 and 2000. It is clear that for each co-
hort the largest emigration rates (increase in emi-
grants as percentage of the group) was observed
Table 2 
Birth cohort (age 0–4) as percentage of the population




Philippines 16.4  12.6 
Mexico 17.6 9.6 
Senegal 18.4  16.5 
Nigeria 17.1 16.1 
Source: Author’s calculation based on UN population
data.
Table 3 
Percentage abroad and emigrationrates of the 







1970  1.0 1.9
1980  2.6 5.4
1990 7.6  2.0 
2000 8.4  2.2 
2005 10.2  – 






















Figurebetween the age of 15 and 35.After 40 the percent-
age of residents abroad does not increase,and some-
times it decreases (return migration). Hanson and
McIntosh (2010) show that the simple demographics
described above explain more than 40 percent of the
increase in emigration rates from Mexico to the US
in the period 1970–2000.
Countries like Senegal, Nigeria and Congo (Table 2)
have only recently reached the peak of their birth
cohort size. The existing network of migrants from
these countries in Europe and the recent growth in
the African economies may generate in the coming
decades a flow of migration to Europe similar to the
one from Mexico to the US during the 1980s and
1990s. European policy makers should therefore be
prepared to plan for these increasing pressures.Immi-
grants from these countries can be absorbed much
better if they are allowed to enter on working visas.
This would reduce the incentive to undocumented im-
migration.Increasing the inflows of documented,pro-
ductive, young immigrant workers would also in-
crease their contribution to the economy and to the
pension system. An important step will be to involve
African countries in negotiations about number of
visas, type and enforcement of immigrant laws. More
work visas can be negotiated with African countries
in exchange for common action to keep immigration
legal. Demographic pressures are slow and predict-
able and hence European countries should begin plan-
ning accounting for these changes.
Immigrants and age structure in Europe
The increased immigration pressure from Africa,with
its young population, and the low fertility in Europe
have two interesting consequences on the popula-
tion structure of European countries. First, a large
share of the population growth in European coun-
tries could be driven by immigrants.Already during
the 1990s,immigrants represented around 35 percent
of the net population growth in Germany and the
UK and about 40 percent of net population growth
in the Sweden and Ireland.3 For some countries,
whose native population is already in decline (e.g.,
Italy) immigration was the only component, during
the last decade, that partially offset this decline. Sec-
ond,the inflow of immigrants will slow down the rel-
ative growth of the dependency ratio (number of peo-
ple retired relative to working population). Young
immigrants will eventually age making this a transi-
tional effect. However, delaying the increase in the
dependency ratio can be important to allow a less
drastic reduction in pension benefits and increase in
pension age during the transition period.
Most recent estimates find small positive fiscal effects4
of immigrants in countries with small welfare systems
such as the US (Smith and Edmonton 1997) and small
negative effects in countries with more generous wel-
fare systems (Rowthorn 2008). However in countries
that are rapidly ageing, the contribution of immi-
grants,who pay into the social security system but will
not draw from it for a while, is much larger than their
cost.Moreover,for European countries such as Spain,
Italy and Greece in which the burden of public debt
per capita is high the growth of total GDP (not just
per capita) is crucial to maintain the sustainability of
the debt.Total GDP growth is helped by immigrants.
One interesting policy would be to add on an extra fee
for  immigrants' contributions to the public pension
system.This would make more transparent their sub-
sidization of the older citizens (currently they subsi-
dize pensions in a pay-as-you-go systems just as a
virtue of their age distribution).Also,in order to make
politically feasible the increase in the number of tem-
porary and permanent immigrant work visas, govern-
ments could charge significantly higher fees.More im-
migrants will be able to enter Europe and work legal-
ly, thereby generating larger inflows of tax revenues
for the public pension system and for the receiving
government.We think that a significant increase in the
quota of work visas together with an increase in the
immigration fees would bring those beneficial effects
and be politically more feasible.
Younger immigrants can also help productivity and
the wages of natives in the labor markets.The differ-
ence in age profile between immigrants and natives
is a dimension of skill complementarities5 that may
help native workers.As the labor supply of older rel-
ative to younger workers increases in European coun-
tries, this will depress the wages and employment
opportunities of older workers. Card and Lemieux
(2001) show how the large size of young cohorts de-
pressed wages for young workers in the 1970s in the
US.The same effect may happen for older cohorts in
Europe in the 2000s.Immigrants could attenuate this
effect by filling jobs and occupations that need youn-
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ger workers and complement the productivity of
older workers who would retain more supervisory
and organizational roles. Increasing the number of
work visas for young immigrants would, therefore,
also help alleviate the age imbalance on the labor
market.
Ageing and immigration policies
Demographics may also play a role in shaping the
opinion of natives about immigration. From an eco-
nomic and fiscal point of view immigration is likely
to benefit mostly older workers and retirees. Immi-
grants help pay for their pensions and provide labor
that increases the productivity of capital (mostly
owned by older people). They rent their houses and
complement their skills on the labor market. Based
on economic calculations the elderly should be par-
ticularly well disposed towards immigrants. On the
contrary, most surveys and studies (e.g., Card, Dust-
mann and Preston 2009; Hanson, Scheve and Slaugh-
ter 2007; United Nations 2009) find that older people
maintain less favorable attitudes towards immigrants
than young people, other things being equal.
Probably older people feel more vulnerable and less
inclined to changes and immigrants often may repre-
sent a change in the opportunities and customs of
the local communities.As older workers and retirees
become an increasingly important constituency,
politicians will cater more to their preferences.They
will also play to their fears. In this respect it will be
even more important to offset these ideological ten-
dencies with more informed and fact-based consid-
erations. If an ageing population encourages a shift
towards more demagogic anti-immigration plat-
forms,the elderly themselves will be paying the high-
er economic price as they will have to forego the
important benefits described above. It will be very
important that the public discourse on immigration
brings more information and analysis of the econo-
mic benefits and less ideology to inform and empow-
er this vulnerable group. The elderly would benefit
from more open immigration policies and therefore
should support them.
Immigrants, the home-care sector and the retire-
ment decisions of natives
One of the challenges of the demographic evolution
in Europe is the pressure it creates to reform the pen-
sion systems. The shift towards less generous bene-
fits, fully-funded systems and higher retirement age
is inevitable. The question is how drastic and rapid
the change must be in order to ensure sustainability.
I have already mentioned how the younger age of
immigrants and a system based on larger immigra-
tion fees and a larger quota for working visas can
help the transition. There is an additional effect of
immigration that could be quite relevant, especially
for southern European countries.
The ageing of the population is increasing the needs
for services to assist elderly and grant them per-
sonal and health care. In many countries people
over 80 years of age need these services in south-
ern European countries, because of cultural values
and lack of available public care, most of the assis-
tance is done at home. Immigrants have become
the overwhelming majority of workers who assist
elderly people in their homes.In Italy 70 percent of
home-care jobs were taken by immigrants in 2008.
Similarly a large part of home care in Spain, Greece
and Portugal is performed by immigrants. Without
immigrant workers,the assistance of elderly people
is usually performed by the family, most likely by a
woman. Such involvement in the care of elderly
parents is likely to result in earlier retirement (typ-
ically in the age range between 50 and 65). An in-
teresting recent study (Romiti and Rossi, 2011)
shows that in Italy the presence of immigrants sig-
nificantly increased the retirement age of women
with a living elderly parent. An increase in immi-
grants by 4 percent of the population in a region
increased the average retirement age by one year.
As a consequence immigrants, by providing afford-
able care for ageing parents, allow women in their
fifties and sixties to delay retirement age. This is
another way immigration will complement native
needs and smooth the transition towards higher re-
tirement ages, reducing the costs of those decisions
for native families. In the elderly care sector there
should be a significant increase in the number of
visas for foreign workers. These jobs are in high de-
mand because of the ageing population. The avail-
ability of affordable immigrant services in the sector
will encourage women to stay in the labor force and
retire later.A larger number of permits,together with
a larger visa-processing fee, and increased speed and
efficiency in granting them, will generate jobs, en-
courage later retirement and produce valuable pub-
lic revenues.Conclusions
Demographic trends are slow and are overlooked
during periods of economic turmoil and rapid
change as in the years since the financial crisis. Nev-
ertheless they have a deep and important long-term
effect. The ageing of the population in Europe, the
low fertility and the increasing share of older people
are deeply changing our economies and societies.
Immigration that typically brings younger people re-
presents an opportunity to reduce the adverse con-
sequences of those demographic changes in Europe.
Immigrants will slow the growth of the ageing popu-
lation, they provide jobs and services needed by an
ageing population,they complement the skills of na-
tives and represent an important contribution to po-
pulation growth. Encouraging larger immigration
flows for working purposes, by increasing the num-
ber of temporary and permanent working visas would
help Europe cope with the consequences of ageing.
At the same time ageing societies may become more
hostile to changes and,therefore,to immigrants.Rais-
ing the fees for working visas and using the revenues
to fund the pension system and local government ser-
vices would help to increase further the benefits to
the receiving countries. It would also raise the politi-
cal support for a larger number of working immigrants.
While it would be very profitable from an economic
and demographic perspective to encourage the im-
migration of young working people from poor coun-
tries to Europe, ideological and cultural attitudes of-
ten prevail.We economists should continue to point
out the advantages of migrations and the economic
costs of the ideological positions that restrict the in-
flow of working immigrants. Europe needs to have
immigration policies that take into account these
long-term trends and are based on factual informa-
tion and economic considerations that move beyond
the ideological and “emergency” approach it has
taken so far.
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